Libertarian Theory

Jakub Wozinski, who previously published “Hayek and Departure from Praxeology” in Libertarian Papers, asked me to post the draft of his working paper “A Priori of Justice” (RTF; PDF; text here). His note is below. Feel free to email comments to him or leave them in the comments field below.

 ”A Priori of Justice” is an attempt to systematize the whole libertarian legal theory. This paper is based mostly on Hoppean and Rothbardian concepts, but I suggest some improvements. In my approach I emphasize homesteading should be understood as change of location and surety, i.e. material substratum of valid contracts. It is my view that this perspective can shed new light on the whole of libertarian theory.

Another aspect of my paper is the identification of law and ethics as one integrated theory justified by action and argumentation axioms. A libertarian legal code is presented as the only possible ethic and all other theories considered hitherto to be ethics are just beliefs which cannot be rationally proved.

I am hopeful that the reader will find in “A Priori of Justice” more than just the repetition of the old theories and will be surprised by my fresh approach.

Before publishing this paper, I would like to receive comments and other suggestions for improvement or refinement from other libertarians interested in these matters. I will be grateful for any comments (please send them to: wozinski@poczta.onet.pl).

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The latest news from Norway is the prison that might, for the next 21 years, be a home for Anders Behring Breivik. After reviewing the videos and photos, I must say, Ohio State offered me no better when I went there on scholarship some years ago (and my scholarship was only good for four years). My dorm mates were generally more presentable, perhaps, but I never got a hot blonde personal trainer. Halden Prison almost seems designed to entice the vacillating young psychopath, who has not yet worked up the gumption, to go ahead and follow through on his dreams.

It is a subject that, for the modern American, is begging for ridicule and parody. I myself nearly dipped into it in the first paragraph, and I admit that the idea of a man murdering so many innocents and thereby earning an all-expenses-paid stay at the Halden Resort rankles a bit. The fact that the descendants of the Vikings are responsible adds another fascinatingly perverse element to it.

And yet… does the modern American, currently occupied with mocking Scandinavia, not have a closer target for his contempt? Is the prison system that he is forced to subsidize any less perverse and appalling? Might one not even argue — I almost hesitate to type the words — that the Norwegian way, though indisputably stupid, is superior to the American way? Not if one is running for office, of course, but those of us not connected to politics, i.e., those of us who can still afford to use our thinking organ, might wish to examine things with a critical eye.
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“Pryor and four teammates were suspended Thursday by the NCAA for the first five games of next season for selling championship rings, jerseys and awards. They also received improper benefits — from up to two years ago — from the tattoo parlor and its owner.”

~ Article at ESPN.com

The situations of Ohio State University Quarterback Terrelle Pryor, leading rusher Dan Herron, No. 2 wide receiver DeVier Posey, All-Big Ten offensive tackle Mike Adams and backup defensive end Solomon Thomas should be pretty well known to the sports fans in our studio audience.  The sports airwaves have been chock-full with commentary on it for the last few days.  From a sports reporting standpoint, the coverage has often been quite good and pretty far ranging.  ESPN generally, and Pat Forde and Adam Rittenberg specifically, have covered the issue and the rather obvious duplicity of the NCAA in some detail.  For the overarching view of the issues, I recommend those columns.  To get an impression of my view of the duplicity of the NCAA, I highly recommend this video from Michael Smith.  Smith and I agree completely, the NCAA was duplicitous in its application of sanctions against these players and against The Ohio State University.  But there is more to it than that, and it is upon those differences that I will focus in this brief rant.

To make a long story short, and save the reader from wading through the MSM reporting, here is the synopsis.  These players sold and/or bartered with items and notoriety they had been given or “earned” in their capacity as football players at The Ohio State University.  Those benefits included both cash and services, in the fashion of tattoos from a local tattoo parlor in Columbus.  (No, I’m not making this up.)  They have been found guilty of “receiving improper benefits.”  Their punishment is:  being suspended for five games next football season.  They will all compete in the Sugar Bowl this season.  (No, you didn’t misread anything.  That is exactly what is happening.)

There are really only two issues of interest from my libertarian perspective.  First is the issue of ownership and its privileges. One would hope that rules imposed by the NCAA would somehow reflect an understanding of private property ownership.  Let us call that Standard One.  Secondly, there is the issue of rules and regulations.  If there is a rule in place that circumvents my ownership, e.g., an agreement, either implicit or definitive, that I will not receive “benefits” from ownership until such time as said agreement is no longer in place, what punishment fits the “crime” of breaking that contract?  One would hope that penalties levied by the NCAA would reflect some understanding of punishment that fits the crime in the most obvious sense.  Let us call that Standard Two.

These are the only questions that exist in the Ohio State Affair, or Tattoo Gate, as I will hereafter refer to it.  As anyone who has witnessed the amazingly transparent actions of the NCAA over the last few months can attest, what can be generally said about the imposition of NCAA sanctions is this:  The NCAA generally opts for a punishment that fails to meet either standard.  This case is no different.  In fact, Tattoo Gate is an object lesson in how to be damned certain that one’s actions meet no discernible standard at all.

If a person owns an item, the disposition of that item should be the business of that owner only.  In short, he can do whatever he wishes with it, including, but not limited to, sell it, give it away, bury it in the back yard, or burn it for warmth.  The obvious (read:  statist) exception of intellectual property aside, this seems pretty straightforward.  Clearly then, something else must cover the case of NCAA athletes.  This is where Standard Two comes in.  The NCAA apparently believes, and I’ll even agree with them for arguments sake, that the “contract of scholarship athleticism” precludes actions that might otherwise be appropriate for an owner of real property such as a championship ring or other soon-to-be-useless whatnottery.  Tattoo Gate is not about ownership.  Tattoo Gate it is about rules.

So then, a scholarship athlete cannot sell NCAA-sanctioned trinkets while participating in NCAA activities and/or while maintaining eligibility.  To do so constitutes the receiving of improper benefits and is justification for punishment.  Clearly, the players in question broke the rules.  Just as clearly, imposing a sanction of five games—approximately one-third of a college football season—is a hefty penalty.  Why then would the NCAA impose the penalty next season, effectively allowing the players and the team to benefit from their presence in a (high-profit-generating) bowl game?  That’s a very good question, and a question that no one seems able to answer.

If the infractions were egregious enough to warrant a large penalty—like five games—it would seem to warrant immediate imposition of said sanctions.  If it the infraction is minor enough to allow for imposing a sanction that won’t take place until next season (when at least two or three of those players could be gone to the NFL) it would also seem to not be worth mentioning.

What the NCAA has done, effectively, is harshly punish while simultaneously not punishing.  That’s an elegant implementation of justice and a fine example of what those of us who watch the actions of the NCAA have known for quite some time:  The NCAA is, in the vernacular, FOS.  (That means, loosely translated:  Full of Feces.)  Of course, many of us knew that before Tattoo Gate.  Didn’t you?

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I was reading Sarah Lacy’s “If You’ve Got Social Media Fatigue, UR DOIN IT WRONG” on TechCrunch and was reminded of a passage from Henry David Thoreau’s seminal essay “Civil Disobedience” that I discuss in chapter 6 of my dissertation.

First the passage from Lacy’s article:

Sometimes metrics can be a bad thing and beware of any so-called “social media consultant” who tells you otherwise. What’s the value of a Retweet or a Like? It’s roughly the equivalent to sitting next to someone during a keynote who nods his head at a salient point. Someone hitting a button in front of them is hardly a heady endorsement—nowhere near the impact of someone calling you to tell you about a story he read. That actually takes more than one-second of attention and work.

This reminded me of the moral hazards of voting in electoral politics and Thoreau’s likening it to a sort of gambling with morality:

All voting is a sort of gaming, like chequers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote.

With this last sentence Thoreau is no longer really speaking of voting, as becomes clear later on when he writes “Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence.” He is advocating civil disobedience and participatory democracy.

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It is a common mistake, made even by some libertarians and former libertarians, that libertarians reject the idea of unchosen obligations. Gene Callahan, apparently a former libertarian turned communitarian, is the latest to make this mistake. He says:

Obligation . . . is the crucial idea denied by libertarian political theory.

Well, this is just patently absurd. Libertarians, of course, do not deny that individuals can have obligations to others, including non-humans.

Fortunately, Callahan goes on to clarify what he means:

We can have obligations that we did not agree to take upon ourselves.

But this is something that not all libertarians deny, as a wide and deep enough perusal of libertarian literature will demonstrate.

At the very least, libertarians recognize the unchosen obligation not to threaten or use initiatory physical force against other rational beings (i.e., to refrain from what we call aggression).

Libertarians generally make two important sets of distinctions regarding obligation: that between negative and positive obligations and that between enforceable and unenforceable obligations. One can go further and recognize that obligations can have different weightings relative to one another such that one obligation can override or delimit the legitimate means of fulfilling another.

Rights, at least as I define the term, are legitimately enforceable moral claims against another’s prior obligation not to threaten or use initiatory physical force. The Non-Aggression Principle (NAP) and corresponding rights are unchosen, enforceable negative obligations.

Can we have unchosen positive obligations? Libertarians need not deny this, and not all do. It should be easily recognized that unchosen, unenforceable positive obligations are strictly compatible with the NAP/rights.

What about unchosen, enforceable positive obligations? Provided they are compatible with the NAP/rights, if there are any that meet this description, then libertarians need not deny unchosen, enforceable positive obligations outright. I’ll leave it up to the reader’s imagination to come up with possible examples of unchosen, enforceable positive obligations that are compatible with the NAP/rights. If you take the challenge, bear in mind what I wrote about how one obligation can override or delimit the legitimate means of fulfilling another.

Suffice to say that it is a myth that libertarians (need to) deny unchosen, even positive, obligations. Callahan is attacking a straw man.

To criticize libertarians in general for denying unchosen, enforceable positive obligations, or just certain of them, would be more accurate. But to do so would be to take the position that the threat or use of initiatory physical force (i.e., aggression) is at least sometimes justified — that, for example, what is usually thought of commonsensically as theft or trespass or murder in everyday life, is not theft or trespass or murder in the “political” sphere, i.e., when the state or the “community” does it.

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